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Abstract
This paper examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm performance through
capital-structure choices, using a sample of China’s civilian-run firms listed on the Chinese
stock market between 2002 and 2007. The empirical results demonstrate a nonlinear
relationship between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial ownership drives the
capital structure into a nonlinear shape, but in an opposite direction to the effect of
managerial ownership on firm value. The results of simultaneous regressions suggest that
managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Our findings
imply that the “interest convergence” and “entrenchment” effects of managers’ behaviour in
terms of managerial ownership can also explain the agency-relevant situation of China’s
civilian-run firms.
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Introduction
The effects of managerial ownership on firm value have been of particular research interest in
the corporate finance literature (Denis & McConnell 2003). Most commentators concur that
managers’ and shareholders’ interests are not fully aligned. This conflict of interest produces
agency problems that reduce firm value. Thus, an increase of managerial ownership helps to
connect the interests of insiders and shareholders, and leads to better decision-making and
higher firm value. However, when the equity owned by management reaches a certain level,
further increase of managerial ownership may provide managers with sufficient shares to
pursue their own benefit without concern for decreasing firm value. When managerial
ownership approaches a considerably high level, the agency problem can be largely mitigated
due to the full alignment between the interests of managers and shareholders. Therefore, it is
hypothesised that managerial ownership and firm value have a nonlinear relationship (Cho
1998; McConnell & Servaes 1990; Morck, Shleifer & Vishny 1988).
Most of the cited literature focuses on the relationship between managerial
shareholding and firm performance in the developed market. Because of the absence of
essential legal protections and appropriate governance mechanisms, agency problems in
many emerging markets are relatively more severe than those found in developed markets
(La Porta et al. 1998; Wei, Xie & Zhang 2005). Claessens and Djankov (1999) examined the
relationship between management equity incentives and firm performance for 706 Czech
firms and found that profitability changes in human capital are quite important in bringing
about improved corporate performance in transition economies. Bunkanwanicha, Gupta and
Rokhim (2008) investigated the relationship between debt, managerial behavior and firm
performance in Thai and Indonesian markets. Their results highlight the importance of the
country-specific institutional settings in managerial ownership-related agency problems.
The Chinese securities market emerged with the establishment of the Shanghai Stock
Exchange in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1991. During the first few years after
the markets opened, most listed companies came from state-owned enterprises; later, many
non-state-owned companies were also listed on the market. Generally, China’s firms are
categorised according to the dominant ownership, for example, a “state-owned firm” means
that the company is dominantly owned by the state; a “civilian-run firm” is dominantly
owned and run by civilians, rather than by the central or local government.
One of the unique characteristics of the present Chinese market is the rapidly growing
number of civilian-run firms. The listed companies from non-government enterprises have
appeared since 1992 on the Shenzhen Security Exchange (the first being Shen Huayuan A,
stockcode 000014). An average of only six civilian-run companies acquired listing
qualification each year between 1992 and 1997, but after 1998 the listing of civilian-run
companies accelerated. The proportion of civilian-run companies listed through initial public
offerings (IPOs) was 6.97 per cent by the end of 2003, and this increased to 15.38 per cent by
the end of 2005. By 2007 the total number of civilian-run listed companies was 410,
representing 26.53 per cent of a total of 1,545 firms on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges.4 These data provide evidence that civilian-run firms may represent the trend and
shape of public firms in the continuing economic reform of China.
Although managerial ownership is one of the ways that Chinese companies adopt
Western corporate governance, the proportion of managerial ownership is quite small among
state-owned companies, with a mean value during 2002–2007 of just 0.0929 per cent; in
contrast, the mean value of managerial ownership for civilian-run companies was 9.31 per
4

See: http://www.chinareform.org.cn/ (in Chinese).
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cent. Compared to state-owned enterprises, civilian-run firms have much more autonomy and
profit retention, and managers are more often appointed on merit and ability, rather than
political patronage. Most civilian-run firms adopt a managerial-ownership governance
approach, and their managers have more power to choose financial policies compared to
those in many developed countries. This situation gives managers of civilian-run firms more
discretion over funding, pricing and labor practices (Firth, Fung & Rui 2006). Thus, our study
of the Chinese market may shed light on this relevant financial issue within a non-Western
environment, thereby providing new, relevant information about how to improve the
efficiency of corporate governance in an emerging, transitional economy.
By using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, this study duplicates the
nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value described in the
research by Cho (1998) and Morck et al. (1988). However, we also found that the turning
points of managerial ownerships of Chinese civilian-run companies with respect to firm value
have moved upward. For example, the turning points of companies in developed countries
occurred at 5 per cent and 25 per cent in Morck et al. (1988) and at 7 per cent and 38 per cent
in Cho (1998). In contrast, our regression results show that they occur at 18 per cent and
64 per cent of managerial ownership. We therefore argue that in the Chinese corporategovernance context, managers need more ownership to control the firm for their own
benefits, and then need much more ownership to be motivated to align their own benefit with
shareholders’ interests. Therefore, the two turning points are greater in Chinese civilian-run
listed companies compared to those in firms in developed markets.
While managerial ownership drives capital structure as a nonlinear shape, due to
managerial entrenchment (Berger, Ofek & Yermack 1997; Friend & Lang 1988), the
directions of the nonlinear shapes for managerial ownership and firm value, and for
managerial ownership and capital structure, are inversely related. This study also found that
the direct influence of managerial ownership on firm value becomes insignificant when
capital structure is taken into consideration. The results from simultaneous regressions show
that managerial shareholding significantly affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm
value. The results of simultaneous equations also show that capital structure is endogenously
determined as being in equilibrium in Chinese civilian-run listed companies.
The remaining parts of this paper are organised as follows. Section 2 contains a
literature review and hypothesis development about the relationships between managerial
ownership, debt policy and firm value. Section 3 explains the sample selection and interprets
the summary statistics. Section 4 provides the empirical specifications and results, and also
discusses the methodology and robustness tests. Section 5 concludes this research.
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
One of the examples of pioneering research on the relationship between managerial
ownership and firm value is Morck et al. (1988). The authors used piecewise linear
regressions to estimate the relationship between Tobin’s Q and the shareholdings of the board
of directors for 371 Fortune 500 firms in 1980. They found a positive relationship between
ownership and Q in the 0 to 5 per cent board-ownership range, and in the range beyond
25 per cent, which is dominated by the convergence-of-interest effect. They also found a
negative, though less pronounced, relationship in the 5 to 25 per cent range, in which the
entrenchment effect succeeds the convergence-of-interest effect. McConnell and Servaes
(1990) used regression on Tobin’s Q with the fraction of shares owned by corporate insiders
for firms between 1976 and 1986, and found a curvilinear relationship between managerial
ownership and firm value. Miguel, Pindado and Torre (2004) and Short and Keasey (1999)
studied the association between management ownership and corporate value using the data of
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UK and Spanish firms respectively, and came to a similar conclusion. Davies, Hillier and
McColgan (2005) echo the above investigations, but that work extended the specification of
management holdings from cubic to quintic, and found a similar nonlinear relationship
between managerial ownership and firm value.
These examples in the literature constitute the foundation of the research on
entrenchment and the convergence-of-interest effect arising from managerial ownership and
firm valuation. However, they focus largely on the relationship between managerial
shareholding and firm value in developed economies. Debate on whether such a relationship
has universal relevance in corporations within emerging markets still requires further
evidence. Several recent articles have studied corporate governance in emerging (or
transition-economy) markets, focusing on the relationship between ownership structure and
firm value (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2008; Claessens & Djankov 1999; Lins 2003; Wei et al.
2005). These studies found a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm
value in many emerging markets, revealing that management and insiders have the ability to
engage in the expropriation of other shareholders’ benefits. At low levels of managerial
ownership, an increase in management equity holding closely aligns with the interests of
managers and shareholders, thereby increasing corporate value. However, at relatively high
levels of managerial ownership, an increase in management equity shareholding makes
management more entrenched and less subject to market discipline, thereby reducing
corporate value (Cho 1998). When managerial ownership reaches a considerably high level,
the interest between managers and shareholders are fully aligned. At this level, management
pursues best firm performance, and firm value is increased. Thus we submit the first
hypothesis in this study:
H1: There is a nonlinear “N” shape relationship between managerial
ownership and firm value for Chinese civilian-run firms that represents the change of
the alignment between managers’ interests and shareholder’s wealth, in terms of
managerial ownership level.
The issue of how managerial ownership affects corporate value is also important.
Brailsford, Oliver and Pua (2002) argued that corporate managers and external block owners
are two key groups of shareholders with a powerful influence on the decisions in a firm’s
resource allocation. Cho (1998) discussed the impact of managerial ownership on firm
performance, and thus firm value, as a product of the way shareholding motivates
management to make investment decisions for their own or for shareholders’ benefit.
Leverage choice is another important financial decision. It has various effects on firm
value, which have been proven in classical corporate financial literature (Jensen 1986:
Modigliani & Miller 1963; Myers 1977; Ross 1977). Ruan, Tian and Ma (2009) employed a
relatively recent data set that comprised S&P 500 firms. They observed that capital structure
can act as an intermediate variable affected by managerial ownership, but eventually
influences firm value. Therefore, the following discussion aims to clarify another two points:
first, the relationship between managerial ownership and capital structure; and second, the
relationship between capital structure and firm value.
The theoretical evidence about how managerial behaviour influences financing
choices has emerged only since the middle of the last decade. Zwieble (1996) developed a
model in which managers choose debt for their own empire-building. Novaes (2003) set up a
managerial model to explore how self-interested managers expropriate firm value via the tool
of leverage.
The empirical support for entrenchment that results from managerial ownership
affecting leverage decisions is quite limited. Friend and Lang (1988) examined whether
managerial entrenchment induced by insiders’ equity holding motivates capital structure
decisions, “at least in part”, on a successive-year basis. Berger et al. (1997) used cross76
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sectional analysis to find evidence that firm leverage is affected by the degree of managerial
entrenchment and of entrenched managers' debt-avoidance. Brailsford et al. (2002) used
evidence from Australia to produce a nonlinear relationship between the level of equity stake
owned by insiders and capital structure measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, and supported
the effects of convergence-of-interest and management entrenchment.
When the level of managerial ownership is low, an increase in managerial ownership
has the effect of aligning management and shareholders’ interests (Brailsford et al. 2002).
Managers' main objective is to maximise shareholders’ wealth and achieve higher firm
performance by using less debt to avert financial distress. Thus, a negative relationship exists
between managerial ownership and capital structure (Berger et al. 1997). However, as
managers become entrenched with significant voting power and influence, they can begin to
manipulate the debt ratio to achieve self-interests. For example, they may increase debt to
obtain more cash to make suboptimum investment decisions, or build a “management
empire”. However, when corporate managers hold a considerable proportion of a firm’s
shares, managers’ own interests can be aligned with those of shareholders. The entrenchment
effect decreases, resulting in reduced debt ratio as managers seek to reduce bankruptcy risks;
or alternatively, the agency-related benefits from the use of debt are substituted through
managerial ownership.
With the rapid development of civilian-run companies and the implementation of
managerial ownership governance in the Chinese market, greater focus is required on the
issue of how managerial behaviour in accordance with shareholder ownership influences
firms’ financing behaviour. On the basis of theoretical analysis and empirical evidence from
the literature, we propose the following hypothesis:
H2: A nonlinear “inversed N” shaped relationship exists between managerial
ownership and capital structure in Chinese civilian-run firms, which represents the
change of managers’ incentive motivated by their ownership.
Much of the relevant research indicates that the relationship between managers and
shareholders has the potential to influence financial decision-making, which in turn affects
firm value (McConnell & Servaes 1990; Miguel et al. 2004; Morck et al. 1988; Short &
Keasey 1999). Corporate insiders in Chinese listed companies often gain control over a firm
by swinging the votes their way, but also through offering non-pecuniary benefits, such as
company-paid consumption or building up a “management empire”. Thus, we argue that
agency problems in Chinese civilian-run listed companies are more severe due to the
emerging market environment. Our third hypothesis is:
H3: Managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm
value for Chinese civilian-run firms.
Since the seminal research by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the relationship between
capital structure and firm performance has been a prevalent issue in the financial literature.
Corporate-governance theory predicts that financial leverage influences agency costs, and
thus corporate value. Some commentators suggest that greater financial leverage could help
mitigate agency costs via the threat of acquisition and financial distress (Grossman & Hart
1982; Williams 1987). Morck et al. (1988) found that leverage has a negative — but
insignificant — impact on corporate value, and attribute this to the possibility that managers
in highly leveraged firms might hold a higher than average level of ownership (Davies et al.
2005). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) interpreted the negative association between leverage
and firm value as being due to the relative inflation between now and when companies issued
much of their debt. McConnell and Servaes (1995) investigated equity ownership and the
effectiveness of leverage choice to find a “two-faced” relationship between firm value and
debt. They conjecture that corporate value is positively correlated with the level of debt
financing for firms with few growth opportunities, while firm valuation is negatively
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correlated with the debt level for those with high growth opportunities. However, in reality,
firms with good growth opportunities are normal in a fast-growing country such as China
(Wu & Yue 2009). Chinese civilian-run listed companies can be considered as having more
growth opportunities not only because of their GDP contribution, but also due to their high
performance output.5 Therefore, a negative relationship should exist between capital structure
and firm value in Chinese civilian-run listed companies, and thus our fourth hypothesis is:
H4: Capital structure negatively affects firm value in Chinese civilian-run
listed companies.
A large block of literature regarding the determinants of capital structure considers
firm value to be an important factor influencing corporate capital structure (Korajczyk &
Levy 2003; Ozkan 2001; Titman & Wessels 1988). These mixed results in prior studies have
impelled academics to test whether a reverse causation exists between performance and
capital structure that reflects the endogeneity of capital structure. Berger and Patti (2006)
employed a simultaneous equation model to research the possibility of reverse causality from
firm value to capital structure in the banking industry. They used profit efficiency as an
indicator of firm value and acquired satisfactory effect, which was not only economically
significant and statistically significant, but also confirmed by a number of robustness checks.
This study also examined the endogeneity of capital structure when researching managerial
ownership, capital structure and firm valuation.
Data and Statistics
This study defines civilian-run listed enterprises as the companies ultimately controlled by an
individual or a legal person rather than central or local government, as compared with the
state or a government-related legal person or other ownership type. Sample selection starts
from all Chinese civilian-run listed firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2007. The sample period starts from 2002, as 2001 was
when Chinese companies implemented the New Accounting Standards and Policies. The
sample time ends before 2008, which was when the global financial crisis emerged and the
Chinese stock market fell sharply. Therefore the sample period was selected to mitigate the
influences of shifting accounting standards and financial crises.
In 2005 the China Securities Regulatory Commission launched its reform of nontradable shares, which influenced the ownership structure of listed firms. This study
investigates the mean percentage of tradable shares in listed companies, which increased
from 41.53 per cent in 2005 to 47.61 per cent in 2006, 52.88 per cent in 2007 and 59.01 per
cent in 2008. At the same time, the mean managerial ownership in civilian-run listed firms
were almost the same: at 9.88 per cent in 2005, 10.21 per cent in 2006, 10.07 per cent in 2007
and 10.09 per cent in 2008. Therefore we consider that the reform of non-tradable shares
from 2005 cannot alter our evidence from data from 2002 to 2007.
We excluded from our modelling ST and PT6 firms, firms in financial and insurance
industry and firms with incomplete datasets. The final sample consists of 197 civilian-run
5 For example, in every year between 2000 and 2008, civilian-run (both publicly and non-publicly traded firms)
companies’ gross industrial output was more than 20 per cent of the value of all Chinese companies’ outputs.
However, the proportion contributed by state-owned enterprises (both publicly and non-publicly traded firms)
made up less than 10 per cent of total output, as computed by the relevant data from http://www.stats.gov.cn/ (in
Chinese). The other 70 per cent come from companies dominated by collective ownership, foreign owner,
township owner etc.
6 Chinese listed firms with financial distress are classified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission as
“special treatment” (ST) or “particular transfer” (PT) firms for the purpose of protecting investors’ benefits. If a
listed firm has negative profits for two consecutive years, it is designated as an ST firm. If it continues to
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firms listed between 2002 and 2007; this is an unbalanced panel dataset with 723 firm-year
observations. All the data were extracted from the China Centre for Economic Research
(CCER) database developed by the Beijing Sinofin Information Service Limited Company.
However, we made some necessary enhancements of the data from the annual reports from
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange websites.
This study uses Holderness's (2003) definition of managerial ownership, in which it
means the percentage of equity owned by insiders and block holders, where insiders are
defined as the officers and directors of a firm. Cho (1998) defines insider ownership as "the
fraction of shares, not including options, held by officers and directors of the board” (p. 106).
Davies et al. (2005) consider managerial ownership as having a stake in all board members’
shareholdings. Corporate boards have the power to make, or at least ratify, all important
financial policies, and therefore it is plausible that board members with appropriate stock
ownership have the incentive to provide effective monitoring and oversight of important
corporate decisions (Bhagat & Bolton 2008). Therefore, this study uses the ownership stake
of all board members as a proxy of managerial ownership. We also use leverage ratio (total
debt divided by total assets) as a measurement of capital structure. Tobin’s Q defines a ratio
of the market value of a company’s stock divided by the value of a company’s equity book
value, and can help to capture whether the value of a firm as an operational business is
greater than the cost of the assets required to generate its cash flow (Hovey et al. 2003). This
study uses Tobin’s Q as a proxy of firm value, following the finance and accounting literature
(see for example, Davies et al. 2005; Hovey et al. 2003; McConnell & Servaes 1990, 1995;
Morck et al. 1988).
Table 1 describes managerial ownership, Tobin’s Q and capital structure for the
sample of 197 civilian-run enterprises listed between 2002 and 2007. The mean combined
ownership of all board members is 9.31 per cent, which is almost double that of 4.6 per cent
among the S&P 500 firms in 2005 (Ruan et al. 2009), but still much smaller than the
12.14 per cent of mean insider ownership found in the Fortune 500 firms in 1991 (Cho 1998).
The Tobin’s Q values for data between 2002 and 2007 range from 0.326 to 10.207, with a
mean of 1.413. The leverage ratio measuring capital structure ranges from 0 to as large as
0.953. The mean leverage ratio is 0.481, which is almost the same as the median of 0.497.
The skewness of the three variables shows that both managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q are
positive-skewed, while leverage ratio is negative-skewed. The values for kurtosis indicate
that the distribution of Tobin’s Q is much steeper than that of the other two variables.
Table 1
Summary of Main Statistics
Mean

Median

Maximum Minimum Std. dev

Skewness Kurtosis

Observations

Managerial
ownership

0.0931

0.0009

0.7481

0.0000

0.1657

1.8290

5.4023

723

Tobin’s Q

1.4125

1.0347

10.2065

0.3263

1.0056

3.4387 21.5381

723

Leverage ratio

0.4807

0.4972

0.9528

0.0000

0.1688

-0.3159

2.6444

723

Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding.
Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets; this is extracted from the
CCER database.
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets, which is the measurement of capital structure.
The sample comprises 197 civilian-run Chinese firms listed between 2002 and 2007 on the Shenzhen Stock
achieve losses for one more year, it is designated as a PT firm. A PT firm is delisted if it cannot turn profitable
within another year (Bai et al. 2002).
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Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. There are 723 firm-year observations in total.

Table 2 reports the distribution of the number of observations, Tobin’s Q and leverage
ratio, classified by different ranges of managerial ownership. Here, MANA indicates the
proportion of managerial ownership, which is the stake owned by all board members. The
distribution of firm numbers in the sample is skewed towards low levels of managerial
ownership. In the six years between 2002 and 2007, 505 out of 723 firm-year observations
(comprising 70 per cent of the sample observations) show that board members have less than
5 per cent ownership of the firms. In the second range of 5 to 15 per cent of ownership, 54
firm-year observations are evident, which is a small proportion — about 7 per cent of the
sample. The left-hand observations are allocated evenly within the ranges of 15 to 25 per
cent, 25 to 35 per cent and 35 to 45 per cent of stock ownership; each range comprises
approximately 6 per cent of total observations. Twenty-five firm-year observations have a
managerial ownership of 45 to 55 per cent. However, the managerial holdings do span a wide
range in the remaining 20 observations, which have managerial ownership of more than
55 per cent. This distribution of observations is consistent with the findings of Demsetz and
Lehn (1985) and Morck et al. (1988), “suggesting the prevalence of significant management
ownership” (Cho 1998, pp. 108).
Table 2
Mean Values of Tobin’s Q and Capital Structure by Managerial Ownership Levels
Mean Tobin’s
Q

Std. dev. of
Tobin’s Q

Mean
leverage
ratio

Std. dev. of
capital structure

Managerial
ownership

Number of
observations

0 ≤ MANA < 5%

505

1.3323

0.8711

0.5140

0.1665

5% ≤ MANA < 15%

54

1.4733

1.1183

0.4126

0.1311

15% ≤ MANA < 25%

40

1.7733

1.5906

0.3973

0.1296

25% ≤ MANA < 35%

40

1.8180

1.3831

0.4718

0.1607

35% ≤ MANA < 45%

39

1.3076

0.7108

0.4048

0.1433

45% ≤ MANA < 55%

25

1.2996

0.5526

0.4650

0.2468

55% ≤ MANA
20
1.0961
0.5145
0.3739
0.2155
MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to
total shares outstanding.
Tobin’s Q is derived from the CCER database.
Leverage ratio is calculated by total debt to total assets.
The sample comprises 723 firm-year civilian-run observations listed between 2002 and 2007.

The data in Table 2 also suggest that a nonlinear relationship exists between levels of
managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q. The mean Tobin’s Q increases from 1.332 in the first
range of managerial ownership to 1.473 in the second range, until it reaches 1.818, where
managerial ownership is between 25 to 35 per cent. The mean Tobin’s Q falls to 1.308 in the
range of 35 to 45 per cent of managerial ownership, until it reaches 1.096 in the range when
managerial ownership is over 55 per cent. This distribution constitutes an accurate, nonmonotonic result from the descriptive statistics; however, the shape of the Tobin’s Q profile
has just one turning point, rather than two as we proposed in H1. The insufficiency of
observations in the last of range of managerial ownership (over 55 per cent) might be the
main reason for this result.
The association between the levels of equity stake owned by board members and
capital structure measured by leverage ratio is also non-monotonic, as shown in Table 2. At
the low level of managerial ownership, below 5 per cent, the mean leverage ratio is 0.514.
The leverage ratios decrease to 0.413 and 0.397 in the following two ranges of managerial
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ownership. The leverage ratio then increases to 0.472 in the range 25 to 35 per cent of
managerial ownership. Thereafter, the leverage ratio falls again to 0.405 at the range 35 to
45 per cent managerial ownership. Interestingly, the mean leverage ratio shows yet another
increase to 0.465 and decrease to 0.374, which might be due to the finer classification used in
our sample. At the very least, a cubic curve exists between managerial ownership and
leverage ratio, as derived from the results of the summary statistics in Table 2.
Model Specifications and Results
In this section we explore the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value,
and the relationship between managerial ownership and capital structure, by using two OLS
models. We use simultaneous equations to investigate the intermediate role of capital
structure and do some final robustness tests.
MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND FIRM VALUE
In order to model the relationship between Tobin’s Q and managerial ownership, and
determine two extremum turning points of managerial ownership when Tobin’s Q changes
directions, we specify a cubic function7 as follows:
Q = a + 1 MANA +  2 MANA2 +  3 MANA3 + control variables + ε (1)
where MANA stands for the proportion of managers’ stock ownership and Q stands
for Tobin’s Q measuring firm value. Control variables8 include leverage ratio and firm size,
which are often the most important factors for Tobin’s Q (Hovey et al. 2003; Firth et al.
2006).
Table 3 shows the regression results with and without control variables between
managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q. After the insignificant result of the Hausman test, we
adopted the period random effect model with unbalanced panel data from our sample.
The intercept coefficients, which are the estimation of Tobin’s Q in firms without
managerial holdings, are 1.23 and 2.97 in the equations with and without control variables,
respectively. Each coefficient concerning managerial ownership is of the expected sign, but
the significance is not as satisfactory as found in other research (for example, Cho 1998;
Davies et al. 2005; Himmelberg et al. 1999; McConnell & Servaes 1990; Morck et al. 1988).
MANA is significant at 5 per cent levels in the equations with and without control variables.
The squared managerial ownership (MANA2) has a significant negative effect on Tobin’s Q
at the 10 per cent level in the equation without control variables, but the coefficient is not
significant in the equation with control variables. The R2 is larger in the equation with control
variables than in the equation without control variables. These R squares are similar to those
found in other relevant papers (for example, Cho 1998; Davies et al. 2005; McConnell &
Servaes 1990). We then calculated turning points by derivation of Tobin’s Q from Equation 1
7

Morck et al. (1988) found two turning points of managerial ownership to firm value; McConnell and Servaes
(1990) modelled the relationship as a quadratic function, which had only one turning point; Cho (1998) and
Miguel et al. (2004) found two points, following Morck et al. (1988); while Davies et al. (2005) used a quintic
equation and found four turning points. This paper does not believe that the number of points matters; rather,
that the most important thing is to explain the significance of each turning point. After considering the
theoretical predictions and results of the descriptive statistics employed in this study, we decided to use a cubic
model; in other words, using two extremum points and three intervals of managerial share ownership, as we
predicted.
8
Following Cho (1998), we do not put a lot of effort on control variables in Equations 1 and 2 in this study. The
calculation for turning points shown next does not consider the influence of control variables, following Cho
(1998) ; Morck et al. (1988) etc.
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with respect to managerial ownership. The two equation turning points without control
variables are:
MANA = 17.5 per cent
MANA = 64.3 per cent
Table 3
Results of OLS on Tobin’s Q with Managerial Ownership between 2002 and 2007
Constant

MANA

MANA2

1.2346

2.3664

-8.6090

(5.27)***

(2.07)**

(-1.77)*

2.9666

2.7402

(3.84)***

(2.35)**

-7.3924
(-1.50)

MANA3

Leverage
ratio

Size

Industry
dummy

7.0211
(1.38)
3.0382
(0.59)

-0.4586

-0.1497

(-2.64)**

(-1.72)*

yes

R2

Fstatistic

Panel
observations

0.008

1.982

723

0.032

4.658

723

***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel observations are unbalanced between 2002 and 2007.
Tobin’s Q is the dependant variable.
MANA stands for managerial ownership.
MANA2 and MANA3 are the quadratic and cubic terms of MANA.

As we predicted, Tobin’s Q first increases when managerial ownership is less than
17.5 per cent; it then declines until managerial shareholding reaches 64.3 per cent. Finally,
Tobin’s Q rises again slightly as managerial ownership reaches over 64.3 per cent. This result
validates Hypothesis 1.
As an N shape, this nonlinear tendency is consistent with the results of Cho (1998)
and Morck et al. (1988); however, the turning points are different. Morck et al. (1988) used a
piecewise regression on a sample of Fortune 500 firms and found two extremum values of
managerial ownership at 5 and 25 per cent. Cho (1998) also used a grid-searching technology
with a sample of Fortune 500 firms and found turning points of managerial ownership at 7
and 38 per cent. Miguel et al. (2004) used unbalanced panel data of 135 Spanish companies
and found two turning points at 35 and 70 per cent.
The sample differences in firms and study period may explain the variation in the
pairs of turning points. However, we suggest that the sample differences in market
background are the main explanation. The studies by Cho (1998), Davies et al. (2005) and
Morck et al. (1988) presented evidence from the American market. In the Chinese market, in
part because of weak legal protection, management must have a larger ownership for there to
be a convergence-of-interest effect with other shareholders. Also, the sample time period in
this study is closer to the present situation compared to the studies of American companies.
Therefore, we argue that, due to the evolution of corporate governances and regulations, both
in developed and emerging markets, the thresholds of managerial ownership have moved up
for both self-interested decision-making and interest alignment between managers and
shareholders. In other words, managers need more ownership to obtain sufficient voting
power to make decisions that are in their own interests (Ruan et al., 2009), and therefore,
more managerial ownership is required for a full interest alignment between managers and
shareholders in Chinese civilian-run listed firms.
MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Based on the analysis of the theoretical predictions, we now examine the relationship
between managerial ownership and capital structure. For the convenience of a further
comparison, and according to the summary description in Table 2, we present Model 2
below, which is a modification of Model 1. According to the insignificant result of Hausman
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test, we adopt the random-effect model, as we did in Model 1. The regression results are in
Table 4.
CS = a + 1 MANA +  2 MANA2 +  3 MANA3 +Control variables +ε (2)
Table 4
Results of OLS on Capital Structure with Managerial Ownership between 2002 and 2007
Constant

MANA

0.5117

-1.5120

(69.40)**

(-6.22)**

0.5799

-1.3733

(25.75)**

(-5.67)**

MANA2
5.8719
(5.65)**
5.4140
(5.24)**

MANA3

CR5

ROA

Industry
dummy

-6.0928
(-5.61)**
-5.6118
(-5.19)**

-0.1376

-0.0608

(-3.07)**

(-3.18)**

yes

R2

Fstatistic

Panel
observations

0.086

22.511

723

0.112

18.153

723

**represents significance at the 1% level.
Panel observations are unbalanced between 2002 and 2007.
Leverage ratio is the dependant variable.
MANA stands for managerial ownership.
MANA2 and MANA3 are the quadratic and cubic terms of MANA.

In Model 2 and Table 4, MANA stands for the proportion of managerial ownership,
and CS stands for capital structure, which is defined as total debt divided by total assets.
Control variables include ownership concentration (CR5) and return on assets (ROA). The
ownership is highly concentrated in Chinese listed companies (Firth et al. 2006; Hovey et al.
2003; Huang & Song 2006). We use the sum of squared ownership held by the largest five
shareholders to measure the extent of ownership concentration. Return on asset is often the
crucial determinant of capital structure of Chinse listed companies (Chen 2004; Huang &
Song 2006) .
Table 4 shows that all the coefficients are of the expected signs and statistically
significant at the 1 per cent level. We then calculated points of extremum and intersection via
derivation. The two turning points of equations without control variables were:
MANA = 17.8 per cent
MANA = 46.4 per cent
The results of Model 2 show negative relationships between managerial ownership
and leverage ratios when managerial ownership is in the range from 0 to 17.8 per cent or
beyond 46.4 per cent; however, a positive relationship between managerial ownership and
leverage ratios exists when managerial ownership is in the range 17.8 to 46.4 per cent. This
result validates our predictions and Hypothesis 2, and simultaneously supplements the
evidence from Brailsford et al. (2002), in which a nonlinear inverted U-shaped relationship
exists between the level of managerial ownership and leverage ratios in top 500 companies
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
Figure 1 shows the regression results of Models 1 and 2 and the estimated turning
points. The track generated by Model 1 displays a nonlinear relationship between managerial
ownership and Tobin’s Q, indicating that firm value increases as managerial ownership rises
from 0 to 18 per cent of P1 at point A. Firm value then falls as board ownership increases,
until another value of 64 per cent of P3 at point D is reached. Finally, firm value increases
again, albeit slightly, for managerial ownership levels above 64 per cent. The relationship
between capital structure and managerial ownership is also non-monotonic, as described by
the track generated by Model 2. The value of the leverage ratio measuring capital structure
decreases to point B in managerial ownership of less than 18 per cent. The value of debt ratio
then increases to point C, until managerial shareholding reaches point P2, which occurs at
46 per cent of managerial ownership. The value of leverage goes down again when the stake
of managerial ownership is over 46 per cent. The coincidence of 64 per cent and 46 per cent
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of managerial ownership may be due to the limited sample of observations in the ranges over
45 per cent compared to the multitude of sample observations in the ranges with less
managerial ownership. Conversely, however, this may reflect the institutional and corporategovernance environment in China, where the relationship between managerial ownership,
capital structure and firm value is more complicated than in developed markets.
Tobin’s Q/capital structure

C

A

Tobin’s Q

P1 = 0.18
P2 = 0.46
P3 = 0.64

D
B
Capital structure
P2

P1

P3

Managerial ownership

Figure 1 Relationships Between Firm Value, Capital Structure and Managerial Ownership
Figure 1 shows the three levels of managerial ownership. At a low level (less than
18 per cent), external discipline and internal controls or incentives dominate managers’
behaviour (Davies et al. 2005; Fama 1980). Managerial labour markets operate on the
principal that poorly performing managers can be removed and appropriately disciplined
(Davies et al. 2005). Managers in these markets have sufficient incentive to adopt financial
policies, such as debt decisions, that avert financial distress and achieve better firm
performance. As the level of managerial equity ownership rises beyond a certain level
(approximately 18 per cent), managerial objectives begin to be entrenched. Internal
mentoring and external discipline become weak. This lack of disciplinary control over
management may strengthen managers’ ability to pursue their own benefits at the cost of
decreasing firm value by using suboptimal corporate policies. As the level of managerial
ownership reaches a relatively high value (in this study, at 46 and 64 per cent), managers
align their interests with those of other owners, which leads to management behaviour aimed
at maximising value, as predicted by Jensen and Meckling (1976) – for example, when
managers use less debt to avoid being purchased or increasing the firm's financial risk.
The above results of OLS regressions validate Hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 3
conjectures that managerial ownership affects capital structure, which in turn affects firm
value in Chinese civilian-run listed firms. However, we could not confirm this transmitting
association without a stricter test, so we estimated a simultaneous equations model to test this
relationship.
MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP, CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND FIRM VALUE
To capture potential multiple relationships between managerial ownership, capital structure
and firm performance, we applied a set of simultaneous equations using the three-stage leastsquare method.
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Managerial ownership = f (firm value, capital structure, ROA) (3)
Firm value = g (managerial ownership, capital structure, size) (4)
Capital structure = h (managerial ownership, firm value, ROA, CR5) (5)
We estimated the simultaneous equations with control variables. ROA is return on
assets calculated as net income divided by the total assets at the year end. CR5 is the
ownership of the top five large shareholders, which is a proxy of ownership concentration.
Size is the logarithm of total assets.
The selection of control variables was mainly based on the recent body of literature
concerning corporate governance issues (Claessens & Djankov 1999; Firth et al. 2006; Hovey
et al. 2003; Huang & Song 2006). This study also advanced dummy variables representing
the industry effect, based on both China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) industry
codes and Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry codes, but the coefficients
of industry variables are not significant; therefore, for simplification purposes, we eliminated
them in the final results.
Table 5 reports the regression results of the simultaneous equations. We use lagged
variables (managerial ownership t-1, Tobin’s Q t-1, leverage ratio t-1) and all control variables as
instrument variables. According to the results for the multiple relationships between
managerial ownership, capital structure and firm value, as Cho (1998) and Himmelberg et al.
(1999) document, once endogeneity is controlled, the perceived impact of managerial
ownership on corporate value disappears. The results of the firm-performance equation of
Model 4 in Table 5 suggests that the levels of managerial shareholding (MANA, MANA2 and
MANA3) do not influence firm value significantly, which contrasts with the OLS results of
Model 1. This evidence reflects the complicated causality between firm value and managerial
ownership: other variables may act as intermediates to assist managerial ownership, in turn
imposing effects on firm performance. Capital structure measured by debt ratio has a negative
influence on firm value, as described by the results of Equation 4; this proves Hypothesis 3
and supports the objective condition for capital structure being the intermediate variable
between managerial ownership and firm value. Managerial ownership also has significant
effects on capital structure, as shown in the result of the equation for capital structure
(Equation 5) in the last column of Table 5.
The results of Equation 3 in Table 5 also suggest that the ownership of board
directors is significantly affected by Tobin’s Q: that managerial ownership is endogenously
determined (which is consistent with the results found by Cho 1998; Davies et al. 2005 and
Kole 1995 but different from those in Demsetz & Villalonga 2001). In Equation 3, ROA has
an insignificant coefficient, which suggests that earnings have a low influence on managerial
ownership. Cho (1998) and Davies et al. (2005) used volatility to measure firm performance
in their managerial-ownership equations and obtained similar results. Furthermore, the
negative and significant coefficient of capital structure in Model 3 suggests that board
directors in firms with lower debt hold a larger fraction of their firm’s shares.
The second column of Table 5 represents the coefficients of Model 4. Relevantly,
asset size is quite a significant determinant of firm performance. Therefore, we also used
company size as measured by logarithm of assets as a control variable in Equation 4. As
shown in Table 5, a negative function emerges regarding the ratio of company size to firm
value, which echoes the findings of Berger and Patti (2006), McConnell and Servaes (1990)
and Miguel et al. (2004) but the coefficient is insignificant, which is different from the results
of McConnell and Servaes (1995).
The significant negative coefficient of leverage ratio in Equation 4 warrants more
discussion. Leverage is one way of imposing external discipline on management and, if
effective, leads to increased corporate value. However, as Huang and Song (2006) explain, a
higher Tobin’s Q means good growth opportunity for Chinese firms. Firms with brighter
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growth opportunities tend to have lower leverage and aim to avert the wealth transfer from
shareholders to creditors. In this study, the negative association between leverage ratio and
Tobin’s Q also meets the requirement of being an intermediate variable of managerial
ownership on firm performance. Thus, we can take this negative relationship as evidence of
Hypothesis 4.
Table 5
Simultaneous Regression Analysis Using Three-Stage Least-Squares Method
Variable
Constant term

Managerial ownership
(3)

Firm value (4)

0.1728 (7.85)***

1.8284 (2.03)**

Capital structure (5)
0.3273 11.47)***

Tobin’s Q

-0.0308 (-4.64)***

-0.0593 (-6.41)***

ROA

-0.0072 (0.58)

-0.0460 (-4.02)***

Managerial ownership t-1
Capital structure

0.7948 (29.60)***
-0.1937 (-5.62)***

MANA
MANA

2

MANA

3

-1.9818 (-4.01)***
11.0050 (1.90)

-0.1758 (-2.27)***

-40.1280 (-1.71)

0.8002 (3.31)***

3.0382 (0.44)

SIZE

-0.0652 (-0.67)

Tobin’s Q t-1

1.3352 (14.21)***

CR5

-0.0434 (1.48)

Leverage ratio t-1
R2
Number of observations

-1.5000 (-1.58)

0.5547 (17.63)***
0.616

0.242

587

587

0.453
587

The dependant variable of Model 3, Managerial ownership, is managerial shareholding in year t.
The dependant variable of Model 4, Firm value, is Tobin’s Q in year t.
The dependant variable of Model 5, Capital structure, is leverage ratio in year t.
Tobin’s Q is market value of assets divided by book value of total assets.
ROA is the net income divided by the total assets at the year end.
CR5 is the ownership sum of the five largest shareholders.
Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to
total shares outstanding.
The quadratic and cubic terms of MANA are MANA2 and MANA3.
Size is the logarithm of total assets.
Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding.
Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
The sample comprises 197 civilian-run Chinese firms listed between 2002 and 2007.
The unbalanced panel data construct 723 observations, but there are only 587 effective observations in
simultaneous equations.
All independent variables refer to the values in year t, except those with the subscript t-1.
*** and ** represent significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.

ROA measures a firm’s efficiency in generating profits from every dollar of assets,
and shows how well a company uses investment dollars to generate earnings growth. ROA
was found to be negatively and significantly related to the level of debt ratio for the results of
Model 5. Noticeably, some of the literature uses the accounting profit rate to measure firm
performance, such as ROE in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and profitability in Chaessens and
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Djankov (1999). However, some critics argue that the accounting profit rate is backwardlooking and Tobin’s Q is forward-looking (Demsetz & Villalonga 2001). In this study the
Tobin’s Q influence on debt ratio is as significant as ROA (-0.059 of Tobin’s Q and -0.046 of
ROA on debt ratio). Therefore, both Tobin’s Q and ROA do have a similar relationship with
capital structure in Chinese civilian-run firms.
We also viewed another important result from the simultaneous equations as being the
endogenous character of capital structure. The significant influence of firm-performance
variables on capital structure are consistent with the results of Titman and Wessels (1988),
Ozkan (2001) and others. Taken together, the capital structure is an intermediate variable of
influence between managerial ownership and firm value, but is also an endogenous variable
that should not be neglected in Chinese civilian-run companies.
ROBUSTNESS TEST
This section uses piecewise regression with simultaneous equations to explore whether
considering different ranges of managerial ownership provides results with a significant
difference from those estimated using Models 3, 4 and 5. The models are as follows (the
estimations are reported in Table 6):
Managerial ownership = f (firm value, capital structure, ROA) (6)
Firm value = g (piecewise managerial ownership, capital structure, size) (7)
Capital structure = h (piecewise managerial ownership, firm value, ROA, CR5) (8)
The piecewise managerial ownership (MANA) in firm value (Model 7) and capital
structure (Model 8) are defined by the results of turning points from Equation 1 (18 per cent,
64 per cent) and Equation 2 (18 per cent, 46 per cent), respectively:
MANA ≤ 18% = managerial ownership if managerial ownership < 0.18,
= 0.18 if managerial ownership of firm ≥0.18.
MANA 18–64% = 0 if managerial ownership < 0.18,
= managerial ownership −0.18 if 0.18 ≤ managerial ownership < 0.64,
= 0.64 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.64.
MANA > 64% = 0 if managerial ownership of firm < 0.64,
= managerial ownership −0.64 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.64.
MANA 18–46% = 0 if managerial ownership < 0.18,
= managerial ownership −0.18 if 0.18 ≤ managerial ownership < 0.46,
= 0.46 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.46.
MANA > 46% = 0 if managerial ownership of firm < 0.46,
= managerial ownership −0.46 if managerial ownership ≥ 0.46.
In Table 6, two piecewise variables of managerial ownership (MANA ≤ 18% and
MANA 18–64%) in Equation 7 remain insignificant influences on firm performance, which are
consistent with the nonexistence of direct effects from managerial ownership on firm
performance shown in Table 5. Concerning the results of Model 8, managerial ownership up
to 18 per cent influences capital structure insignificantly. However, managerial ownership in
the 18 to 46 per cent range and over 46 per cent have significant effects on capital structure at
the 5 per cent level. Most control variables have similar coefficient signs and significance to
the results of Models 3, 4 and 5, including firm size in Model 7. The results of the robustness
test echo Hypotheses 3 and 4.
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Table 6
Robustness Test Using Simultaneous Regression with Three-Stage Least-Squares Method
Variable
Constant term
Tobin’s Q

Managerial ownership t
(6)
0.1716 (7.79)***

1.9165 (2.11)**

-0.0305 (-4.60)***

ROA

0.0080 (0.64)

Managerial ownership t-1

0.7944 (29.64)***

Capital structure

Firm value t
(7)

Capital structure t
(8)
0.3201 (9.80)***
-0.0576 (-5.58)***
-0.0459 (-3.54)***

-0.1922 (-5.58)***

-2.3168 (-5.08)***

MANA ≤ 18%

5.6044 (1.02)

MANA 18–64%

-1.7382 (-3.08)***

MANA > 64%

-8.5673 (-1.07)

SIZE

-0.0525 (-0.53)

Tobin’s Q t-1

1.3511 (14.33)***

MANA ≤18%

-0.6663 (-0.892)

MANA 18–46%

-0.1667 (-2.03)**

MANA > 46%

-0.6966 (-2.31)**

CR5

0.0722 (2.05)**

Leverage ratio t-1

0.5484 (15.98)***

2

R

0.617

0.253

0.446

Number of observations
587
587
587
The dependant variable of Model 3, Managerial ownership, is managerial shareholding in year t; the dependant
variable of Model 4, Firm value, is Tobin’s Q in year t; the dependant variable of Model 5, Capital structure, is
leverage ratio in year t.
Tobin’s Q is the market value of assets divided by the book value of total assets.
ROA is the net income divided by the total assets at the year end.
CR5 is the ownership sum of the five largest shareholders.
Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
MANA is the proportion of managerial ownership, which is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to
total shares outstanding.
The quadratic and cubic terms of MANA are MANA2 and MANA3.
Size is the logarithm of total assets.
Managerial ownership is the ratio of shares owned by all board members to total shares outstanding.
Capital structure is the ratio of total debt to total assets.
The sample comprises 197 civilian-run Chinese firms listed between 2002 and 2007.
The unbalanced panel data construct 723 observations, but there are only 587 effective observations in
simultaneous equations.
All independent variables refer to the values in year t, except those with the subscript t-1.
*** and ** represent significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively.
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Conclusions
This paper extends the previous research (Cho 1998; Davies et al. 2005; Morck et al. 1988
and Short & Keasey 1999) in at least two respects. First, we introduced capital structure as an
intermediate variable between managerial ownership and corporate value. By using
simultaneous equations, we detected the interrelationship between managerial ownership,
firm value and capital structure and found the intermediate role of capital structure. Second,
we extended the research from developed markets to the emerging Chinese market — a
necessary development from previous studies.
Through examination of a sample of 197 civilian-run listed firms between 2002 and
2007, we found a nonlinear relationship between Tobin’s Q and the fraction of shares owned
by boards of directors; this is consistent with the results of Cho (1998), Miguel et al. (2004)
Morck et al. (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999). Tobin’s Q, which is a proxy of firm
performance, increases as managerial ownership grows until it reaches 18 per cent.
Thereafter, Tobin’s Q declines with the increase in managerial ownership until it reaches
64 per cent. Tobin’s Q rises again slightly as managerial ownership increases from 64 per
cent. These two turning points are higher than those detected by Cho (1998) and Morck et al.
(1988), who used Fortune 500 data from an earlier period. We argue that, due to the evolution
of corporate governance and changes of regulation in China’s market environment, the
managerial control for pursuing self-interest and alignment of interests between managers
and other shareholders can only be approached by management holding more ownership than
is the case in other developed countries.
The association between managerial ownership and capital structure is also nonmonotonic. A negative relationship exists between managerial ownership and leverage ratios
when managerial ownership is below 18 per cent or above 46 per cent. Within the managerial
ownership range 18to 46 per cent, the leverage ratio increases as managerial ownership
increases.
At a low level of managerial ownership (less than 18 per cent for Chinese civilian-run
listed companies), managers’ behaviour is dominated by external discipline and internal
controls. For example, managers can be removed because of poor performance. Therefore
there are sufficient incentive for managers to adopt financial policies, such as debt decisions,
that avert financial distress and achieve better firm performance. As the level of managerial
equity ownership rises beyond a certain level (approximately 18 per cent), managerial
objectives begin to be entrenched. Internal mentoring and external discipline become weak.
This lack of disciplinary control over management may strengthen managers’ ability to
pursue their own benefits at the cost of decreasing firm value by using suboptimal corporate
policies. As the level of managerial ownership reaches a relatively high value (in this study,
at 46 and 64 per cent), managers align their interests with those of other shareholders (for
example, using less debt to avoid the firm being purchased).
By using a simultaneous equation regression, we found that managerial ownership
does not influence firm value significantly when capital structure is added into the equation.
Managerial ownership significantly affects capital structure, and capital structure affects
corporate performance directly. These results address the influence of managerial
shareholding on capital structure, which in turn affects firm value. Furthermore, capital
structure is endogenously determined by both firm value and managerial ownership in
Chinese civilian-run listed companies between 2002 and 2007, which inspires us to focus on
financing issues for China’s civilian-run firms.
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